ABSTRACT Encryption with shared key is one of the methods to ensure secure communication. To meet the requirements of keys, this paper investigates the problem of generating private key (PK) and group key (GK) using correlated sources and discrete memoryless wiretap broadcast channel (DM-WBC), in presence of oneway public communication. In the model considered, one transmitter (Alice) and three receivers (Bob, Carol and Eve) are connected via a DM-WBC, and a one-way communication over a public noiseless channel, initiated by Alice, is available. Alice and Bob wish to share a PK that is concealed from Carol and Eve, and they also want to generate a GK with Carol that needs to keep secret from Eve. Under this model, the key capacity regions of PK and GK are established by designing joint source-channel coding schemes to achieve these regions. In PK-generation, the considered model can be viewed as a one receiver two-eavesdropper model, and Alice and Bob have access to correlated source sequences. In GK-generation, the considered model can be viewed as a two-receiver one eavesdropper model, and the three legitimate parties (Alice, Bob and Carol) all have the source observations. Furthermore, the security performance of the generated keys are analyzed by analyzing key leakage rate of each key.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the foundation and precondition of communication, the confidentiality of information has become one of the challenges in wireless communication networks (e.g., wireless sensor networks [1] - [3] and social networks [4] , [5] ). The studies on secure communication from the perspective of information theoretic are increasing gradually, i.e., information-theoretic security or physical layer security, which was a new perspective of cryptography and first studied by Shannon in [6] and proved that in a noiseless communication scenario, if the legitimate users share one secret key used as a one-time pad concealed from the eavesdropper, they can mentioned above, when there is no available secret key, the terminals must generate it first.
Information-theoretic key generation is to investigate how to generate a secret key shared between the target terminals from an information-theoretic perspective. Key generation can be achieved under source models [18] - [29] and channel models [30] - [35] . In source models, terminals can generate secret keys using correlated sources observed from the outputs of discrete memoryless source (DMS), over a public noiseless channel that an eavesdropper has complete access to (i.e., public discussion [36] ). In channel models, transmitters and receivers can generate secret keys through noisy channels, such as wiretap channel with and without feedback [37] - [40] , and multiple access channel with feedback [41] .
Recently, the joint source-channel models for secret key generation have drawn considerable attention, and some interesting models were investigated in [42] - [45] , where transmitters and receivers wish to share secret keys using correlated sources and noisy channels. More precisely, [42] is of great significance and considered a one receiver one eavesdropper model, where two legitimate terminals observe correlated source sequences from DMS and are connected through a DMC with an eavesdropper, who has access to the channel completely. The secret key generated by the two legitimate terminals needs to keep confidential from the eavesdropper. The full characterizations of secret key capacity were provided when a two-way public noiseless channel is available and not available.
As a further extension of the model in [42] , reference [43] considered concatenating an additional legitimate terminal with the transmitter through a noiseless channel that the eavesdropper has access to. Under this model, the problem of simultaneously generating two keys between the legitimate receiver with the transmitter and the additional terminal, respectively, was considered. The two keys all need to be concealed from the eavesdropper, while the key generated by the additional terminal should be additionally protected from the transmitter, and the key generated by the transmitter needs to additionally keep secret from the additional terminal. All terminals except transmitter can observe correlated source sequences from DMS. The key capacity regions for the two expected keys are established by designing joint sourcechannel coding schemes to achieve these regions.
A. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
Notice that there may be multiple receivers (in addition to eavesdropper) in wiretap channels. However, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of key generation in noisy multireceiver networks has not been developed so far. Motivated by above observations, it is thus of interest to investigate whether it is possible to generate secret key over the joint source-channel model including multi-receiver. In this paper, a three-receiver joint source-channel model is considered, where one transmitter (Alice) and three receivers (Bob, Carol and Eve) are connected through a discrete memoryless wiretap broadcast channel (DM-WBC), and a one-way communication (forward communication) over the public noiseless channel with unlimited capacity [12] , [18] , initiated by Alice, is available. Under this model, the following two scenarios for key generation are considered.
• Scenario 1: One receiver and two eavesdroppers. Alice and Bob (one receiver) observe the correlated sources and wish to share one private key (PK) that is concealed from Carol and Eve (two eavesdroppers).
• Scenario 2: Two receivers and one eavesdropper. Alice want to share one group key (GK) with Bob and Carol (two receivers) that is concealed from Eve (one eavesdropper) only, where Alice, Bob and Carol all have the source observations. Motivation for the two scenarios: The two scenarios all consider the case where the eavesdroppers have no side information. For Scenario 1, Alice and Bob wish to generate one PK using correlated source sequences and DM-WBC in presence of the one-way public communication, and Alice can send a private message encrypted by the PK to Bob. On the other hand, if Alice also has a common message and wants to send to both Bob and Carol, a direct approach is to generate another different PK between Alice and Carol using the same idea mentioned above, and the two PKs are mutual independent. However, under this setup, Bob or Carol will be harmed when the common message is encrypted by the unknown PK [17] . To avoid this problem, Scenario 2 is considered, where Alice, Bob and Carol share one GK, and this problem has not been investigated in the area of key generation over joint source-channel models, but widely studied over source models [20] , [23] - [25] .
The considered network can meet some practical scenarios such as the three users (Bob, Carol and Eve) connect with the base station (BS) (Alice) through wireless links and public noiseless channel, and the communication is allowed to be one-way only and from the BS to the three users. Carol or Eve can act a passive eavesdropping user who can listen to the communication when she or he is far enough from the remaining terminals and BS.
In this paper, our main contribution lies in characterizing the PK-capacity region and GK-capacity region from an information-theoretic perspective. The joint source-channel coding schemes, which are based on double random binning and joint typicality [12] , are provided to show that these regions are achievable. The PK-capacity region contains two parts, which benefit from correlated sources and DM-WBC, respectively. The achievable scheme for PK-capacity region decouples source and channel codebooks due to the presence of one-way public communication. To design the achievable scheme for GK-capacity region, a many-to-one mapping is constructed in order to establish the correspondence between source codebook and channel codebook. The expressions of key leakage rates are derived to analyze the security performance of the generated keys. Finally, an example of binary erasure DM-WBC with binary correlated sources is provided to analyze the performance of the two regions. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the preliminaries on key generation are introduced. Section III describes the system model considered in this paper. Section IV provides the main results of this paper, including PK-capacity region and GK-capacity region. The converse and achievability proofs for each region are shown in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Section VII gives an example of binary erasure DM-WBC with binary correlated sources. Conclusions appear in Section VIII.
B. NOTATION
The notations used in this paper are shown in TABLE 1.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON KEY GENERATION
In this section, the basic theory of information-theoretic key generation is reviewed, including two basic models for generating keys and jointly typical sequence decoding for designing achievable schemes.
A. SOURCE MODEL AND CHANNEL MODEL
In this part, source model and channel model [12] , [19] , for key generation are introduced.
Source Model: Given a DMS with r component sources, i.e., (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X r ), terminals (1, 2, . . . , r) can observe the corresponding source outputs (X n 1 , X n 2 , . . . , X n r ) with X n r = (X r,1 , X r,2 , . . . , X r,n ), where n denotes the sequence length. Besides, a public channel, that an eavesdropper has complete access to, is available for one-round or multi-round communication between these terminals. The capacity of the public channel can be unlimited or limited. These terminals can generate single key [20] , [21] , [28] , [46] or multi-key [24] - [27] using the correlated source observations and public discussion.
Channel Model: Given a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WTC) (X , P YZ |X , Y, Z), where X denotes the finite input set and (Y, Z) denote the finite output sets, the legitimate transmitter with input X n ∈ X can agree keys with the legitimate receiver with output Y n ∈ Y, and the keys need to be concealed from an eavesdropper with output Z n ∈ Z. For key generation, the DM-WTC can be extended to other models such as broadcast channel, multiple access channel, wiretap channel with feedback and so on.
B. JOINTLY TYPICAL SEQUENCE DECODING
In this part, the notion of jointly typical sequence [12] , [47] is provided. The design of achievable scheme using the joint typicality is also introduced, and it is illustrated.
Jointly Typical Sequence:
Remark 1: There are about 2 nH (X ) typical X sequences in typical sequences set T (n) (X ), and about 2 nH (Y ) typical Y sequences in typical sequences set T (n) (Y ). However, jointly typical sequences set T (n) (XY ) has 2 nH (XY ) jointly typical XY sequences, which implies
and means some pairs of typical X n and typical Y n are not jointly typical. (1) denotes that the selected pair (X n , Y n ) is jointly typical with probability of 2 −nI (X ;Y ) due to
Given a typical Y n , in randomly chosen 2 nI (X ;Y ) typical X n , there exists at least one typical X n that is jointly typical with Y n , with high probability. Achievable Scheme Using Joint Typicality: Due to that the ideas of the achievable scheme for key generation using joint typicality of source model and channel model are similar, the scheme for source model is provided as an example.
As in FIGURE 1, consider a three-terminal source model, labelled as 1, 2 and 3, with correlated sources (X n 1 , X n 2 , Z n ) ) ∈ T (n) (X 1 X 2 ). The grey circles correspond to 
which is achievable using the scheme designed based on double random binning and joint typicality [12, Sec. 22.3.2] [25]. The details are shown as follows.
1) CODEBOOK CONSTRUCTION AND ENCODING
At terminal 1, randomly and independently assign a bin index k 1 to each sequence x n 1 ∈ X 1 with k 1 ∈ [1 : 2 nR X 1 ]. Denote B X 1 (k 1 ) as the bin indexed by bin index k 1 . Further, randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index k 2 to each sequence in each non-empty bin B X 1 (k 1 ) with
as the sub-bin indexed by sub-bin index k 2 . Then, denote k 1 (x n 1 ) and k 2 (x n 1 ) as the bin and sub-bin indexes of sequence x n 1 , respectively. R X 1 and R k are given by
where > 0 and δ( ) > 0 are arbitrarily small values. The codebook assignment is revealed to all parties. Given a sequence x n 1 satisfy (
terminal 1 reveals the bin index k 1 (x n 1 ) over the public channel. The codebook construction and encoding are also shown in FIGURE 1. 
2) DECODING AND KEY GENERATION
Upon receiving k 1 , terminal 2 tries to find a unique sequencẽ
Terminal 1 sets K = k 2 (x n 1 ), and terminal 2 setsK = k 2 (x n 1 ).
3) INTUITIVE JUSTIFICATION OF SECRECY
According to (3) , each bin
1 on average. Given a typical x n 2 , terminal 2 can find one and only one uniquex n 1 that is jointly typical with x n 2 with high probability. According to (4) , each sub-bin B X 1 (k 1 , k 2 ) has 2 n[I (X 1 ;X 2 )−I (X 1 ;X 2 )+I (X 1 ;Z )+2δ( )+ ] = 2 n[I (X 1 ;Z )+2δ( )+ ] typical sequences X n 1 on average. Given a z n , there exits at least one x n 1 that is jointly typical with z n in each sub-bin B X 1 (k 1 , k 2 ) with high probability. Thus, terminal 3 does not distinguish among sub-bins of x n 1 . Remark 2: More detailed analysis of key generation over source models can be referred to [25] and [27] . On the other hand, by matching the correlated sources to the input and output of the wiretap channel, the achievable scheme for key generation of wiretap channel model can be obtained.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in FIGURE 2, a model in which transmitter (Alice) is connected with three receivers (Bob, Carol and Eve) through a DM-
is considered. Denote X and X n as the finite input set and the corresponding input, respectively. Denote (Y 1 , Y 2 , Z) and (Y n 1 , Y n 2 , Z n ) as the finite output sets and the corresponding outputs, respectively. Alice, Bob and Carol observe correlated source sequences U N , V N and W N respectively, where U ∈ U, V ∈ V and W ∈ W ( U, V and W represent the finite alphabets). The joint probability mass function (pmf) of these sequences is given by [43] For convenience of distinction, in this paper, n corresponds to the sequence length of input and output sequences, and N corresponds to the sequence length of source sequences. Besides, there exists a one-way communication over the public noiseless channel without rate constraint, started from Alice. Alice, Bob and Carol can generate some common randomness (CR) using the one-way public channel.
In the model considered, Alice wishes to generate two types of keys with Bob and Carol, using the correlated source observations, the DM-WBC and the one-way public channel. The two scenarios shown in Section I are redefined as follows.
• Scenario 1: One receiver and two eavesdroppers. One PK K 1 is shared between Alice and Bob, where U = ∅, V = ∅ and W = ∅. K 1 needs to keep secret from Carol and Eve (two eavesdroppers).
• Scenario 2: Two receivers and one eavesdropper. One GK K 2 is shared by Alice, Bob and Carol, where U = ∅, V = ∅ and W = ∅. K 2 needs to be concealed from Eve only (one eavesdropper). Similarly to the main ideas of the key-generation protocols in previous works [19] , [42] , [43] , a key-generation protocol for our model is described in the following definition.
Definition 1: The key-generation protocol using one-way communication over the joint source-channel model consists of two parts, as follows.
• Part 1: To generate K 1 , Alice randomly generates a RV U 0 , and transmits F = U 0 (U N , U 0 ) over the one-way public communication channel. Then, Alice generates another RV U 1 , and sends X n (U N , U 1 , F) over the DM-WBC. For given key functions K 1n (·) and
• Part 2: To generate K 2 , Alice randomly generates a RV U 2 , and reveals F = U 2 (U N , U 2 ) to the one-way public communication channel. Then, Alice generates another RV U 3 , and transmits X n (U N , U 3 , F ) over the DM-WBC. For given key functions K 2n (·),K 2n (·) and
Denote by R 1 the key rate of K 1 , and denote by R 2 the key rate of K 2 . The following definition shows the mathematical conditions that the key pair (K 1 , K 2 ) and the key rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) should satisfy.
Definition 2: For arbitrarily small
> 0 and large enough n, the key pair (K 1 , K 2 ) and the key rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) should satisfy the conditions below [25] , [43] , [49] .
• According to the key-generation protocol described in Definition 1, the following reliability condition should be satisfied.
which means the PKs generated at Alice and Bob should be the same with high probability, and the GKs generated at Alice, Bob and Carol should be the same with high probability.
• K 1 and K 2 satisfy the following secrecy conditions.
where (7) and (8) indicate that K 1 needs to be concealed from Carol and Eve, and (9) indicates that K 2 needs to keep secret from Eve.
• The following uniformly conditions should be satisfied.
where |K 1 | and |K 2 | denote the alphabet sizes of K 1 and K 2 , respectively.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, the main results of this paper are provided, including the key capacity regions of the two expected keys. The corresponding proof for each region is provided in the subsequent sections.
A. PK-CAPACITY REGION
This part considers Scenario 1 and characterizes the key capacity region of K 1 , which is shared between Alice and Bob, where W = ∅. The converse and achievability proofs are relegated to Section V. The PK-capacity region is shown in the following theorem. Theorem 1: For Scenario 1, an achievable key capacity region of K 1 with W = ∅ over the joint source-channel model is given by
for some joint pmf
, where M 1 , M 2 and M 3 are auxiliary RVs and λ = N n . Proof: The proof consists of converse and achievability proofs with the detailed proofs relegated to Section V-A and Section V-B, respectively. In the achievability part, an achievable scheme is provided to prove that the PK-capacity region is achievable.
The intuitive understanding for the key capacity region of K 1 is given as follows. The PK-capacity region in (14) can be divided into two parts and generated separately, i.e.,
Source and channel codebooks can be decoupled due to the presence of the one-way public channel. x benefits from the DM-WBC and can be achieved through channel coding. y benefits from the source components and can be achieved through source coding. x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0 yield a general case and two special cases:
• General Case with x > 0 and y > 0;
• Special Case 1 with x = 0 and y > 0;
• Special Case 2 with x > 0 and y = 0. For Special Case 1, the upper bound of R 1 becomes R 1 ≤ y, and the region can be achieved using correlated sources and one-way public channel. For this case, the problem is equivalent to generate a PK over two terminals via one-way public channel with unlimited capacity as developed in [19] , and our result is coincidence with the result in [19, Th. 1] when the two eavesdroppers do not have side information. For Special Case 2, the upper bound of R 1 becomes R 1 ≤ x, and the region can be achieved using DM-WBC. Section V not only analyzes the achievable scheme for the General Case, but also for Special Case 1 and Special Case 2.
B. GK-CAPACITY REGION
This part considers Scenario 2 and characterizes the key capacity region of K 2 , which is shared between Alice, Bob and Carol, when W = ∅. The converse and achievability proofs for the region are relegated to Section VI. The GK-capacity region is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For Scenario 2, an achievable key capacity region of K 2 with W = ∅ over the joint source-channel model is given by
for some joint pmf P UT 3 = P U P T 3 |U and
, where T 1 , T 2 and T 3 are auxiliary RVs and λ = N n .
Proof: The proof consists of converse proof and achievability proof with the detailed relegated to Section VI-A and Section VI-B, respectively. In the part of achievability proof, an achievable scheme is provided to show that the key capacity region of K 2 in (16) is achievable.
The intuitive understanding for the key capacity region of K 2 is given as follows. For better presentation, the terms in (16) are marked as follows.
x and z benefit from the DM-WBC. y and { benefit from the source components. The non-negativity of each part yields a general case and five special cases:
• General Case with x > 0, y > 0, z > 0 and { > 0;
• Special Case 1 with x = 0, z = 0 and y > 0, { > 0;
• Special Case 2 with x > 0, z > 0 and y = 0, { = 0;
• Special Case 3 with x = 0, { = 0 and y > 0, z > 0;
• Special Case 4 with x > 0, { > 0 and y = 0, z = 0;
• Special Case 5 with x = 0 or y = 0 or z = 0 or { = 0. It is worth noting a few observations for these special cases.
• When Special Case 1 happens, the upper bound of R 2 becomes R 2 ≤ λ min {I (T 3 ; V ), I (T 3 ; W )}, which can be achieved using correlated sources and one-way public discussion. Under this case, our problem is equivalent to the problem of generating a GK through a one-way public channel with unlimited capacity. Our result is coincidence with the straightforward extension of the result in [19, Th. 1].
• When Special Case 2 happens, by [43, Eq. (22)],
where (a) is true by setting T 2 to be a constant; (b) follows the Markov chain
For this case, the region can be achieved using DM-WBC, and our result is coincidence with VOLUME 7, 2019 the lower bound of the secrecy capacity for the threereceiver broadcast channel shown in Eq. (22.6) in [12] . Section VI not only analyzes the achievable scheme for the General Case, but also for all special cases.
Remark 3: The reason of the presence of notation [·] + in (14) and (16) is to make the key rate as large as possible. As an example, for PK-capacity region, if x < 0, the upper bound of R 1 becomes R 1 ≤ λI (M 3 ; V ) − |x| < λI (M 3 ; V ). Notice that if x ≥ 0 holds, R 1 ≥ λI (M 3 ; V ) will always happens. That is to say x ≤ 0 yields to achieve the upper bound of R 1 by not using the DM-WBC.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, the converse proof and achievability proof of Theorem 1 are provided.
A. PROOF OF CONVERSE
This part provides the converse proof of Theorem 1. According to (12) and the analysis in [42] , for arbitrary small values > 0 and n > 0,
where (a) follows the Fano's inequality [26] ; (b) is due to (7) . Then,
where ( 
Furthermore,
where (g) follows by identifying F) ; (h) follows by introducing a time-sharing RV Q, which is uniformly distributed over [1 : N ] and independent with other RVs, and letting M 3 = (M 3,Q , Q) and V Q = V .
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21),
According to (8) , a straightforward extension of (24) yields the region of R 1 as
The Markov chain M 3 − U − V is true due to [43] (
where
• (a) is due to that F and K 1 can be regarded as the functions of U N . According to the key-generation protocol described in Definition 1 of Section III, F = U 0 (U N , U 0 ) and
• (b) follows the fact that Y n 1 can be viewed as a function of F.
Furthermore, (15) is proved as follows. Similarly to the analysis in [42] ,
where (a) follows the relationship
Substituting (28) into (27),
The converse proof of Theorem 1 has been completed.
B. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY
This part provides the details of achievable scheme, which is designed based on double random binning and joint typicality [12] , [43] , for the upper bound of R 1 .
If there exists at least one scheme that can achieve the rate R 1 with
the key capacity region of K 1 is achievable. Based on the previous discussion, without loss of generality, the General Case is considered first. Assume that
The achievable scheme consists of seven processes: codebook construction, encoding, decoding, key generation, key rate analysis, error probability analysis and key leakage rate analysis. The details are as follows.
1) CODEBOOK CONSTRUCTION
Two codebooks are constructed at Alice, denoted as C 1 and C 2 . To construct C 1 , according to 
Denote f (M N 3 ) and µ(M N 3 ) as the bin index and sub-bin index of sequence M N 3 , respectively. 
To construct C 2 , according to 
Denote β(M n 1 ) as the bin index of sequence M n 1 , and denote γ (M n 1 ) as the sub-bin index of sequence M n 1 . The codebook construction is illustrated in FIGURE 4, and the codebook assignment is revealed to all parties, i.e., Alice, Bob, Carol and Eve.
2) ENCODING
Alice looks into C 1 to find a sequence M N 3 , which is jointly typical with U N such that (M N 3 , U N ) ∈ T (N ) (M 3 U ). If there exists more than one such sequences, she randomly chooses one, and if she cannot find such sequence, an error event is declared. Then, Alice reveals the bin index f (M N 3 ) over the one-way public communication channel.
Then, Alice refers to C 2 , and randomly selects a sequence M n 2 . From these sequences M n 1 generated by the M n 2 , Alice randomly selects a sequence M n 1 and sends it to the receivers through the DM-WBC.
3) DECODING
Upon receiving f (M N 3 ), Bob refers to C 1 and tries to find a unique sequenceM N 3 that is jointly typical with V N such that 
If there is no such sequence, he claims decoding failure. The encoding and decoding are illustrated in FIGURE 5.
4) KEY GENERATION
Denote '','' as connect two sequences in series. Alice sets
5) KEY RATE ANALYSIS
Since µ ∈ [1 : 2 N R 03 ] and γ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 07 ], the key rate of K 1 can be as large as
−(λ + 2 ).
6) ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
The decoding error events at Bob for the proposed scheme are defined as
or cannot find suchM
or cannot find suchM 
7) KEY LEAKAGE RATE ANALYSIS (SECURITY)
Denote C as the whole of codebooks C 1 and C 2 . This part analyzes the key leakage rates of K 1 , i.e., secrecy conditions (7) and (8) . When it is clear from the context, this part sets
. It is also clear that the public discussion F = {f }.
where (a) follows the fact that µ and f are mutual independent, and Markov chain µ − f − Y n 2 holds; (b) is due to that γ and M n 2 are mutual independent, and (µ, f ) are determined by M N 3 ; (c) is due to that Markov chain γ − Y n 2 − M N 3 holds. Then, similarly to the analysis in [43] ,
where (d) is due to the following relationship.
y can be bounded utilizing the lemma below.
Proof: See Appendix A. Revisiting (42) ,
for large enough n. Altogether,
for large enough n. By similar arguments above,
for large enough n. To summary, the key leakage rates of K 1 are arbitrarily small, which means the secrecy conditions in (7) and (8) can be satisfied.
The achievability proof for General Case has been completed.
Remark 4: Revisiting the two special cases for PK-capacity region described in Section IV-A,
• For Special Case 1 with x = 0 and y > 0, the upper bound of R 1 becomes R 1 ≤ λI (M 3 ; V ), which can be achieved using C 1 and setting K 1 = µ.
• For Special Case 2 with x > 0 and y = 0, the upper bound of R 1 becomes
which can be achieved using C 2 and setting K 1 = γ .
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, the converse proof and achievability proof of Theorem 2 are provided.
A. PROOF OF CONVERSE
This part provides the converse proof of Theorem 2. According to (13) , for arbitrary small values > 0 and
where (a) follows the Fano's inequality H (K 2 |Y n 2 , W N , F ) ≤ n n ; (b) is due to (9) .
Term x in (46) is
where (c) follows by identifying
follows by introducing one time-sharing RV G, which is uniformly distributed over [1 : n] ; (e) follows by setting
Then, term y in (46) can be bounded as
where (f ) can be obtained by identifying F ) ; (g) follows by introducing one timesharing RV P, which is uniformly distributed over [1 : N ]; (h) follows by setting T 3 = (T 3,P , P) and W P = W .
Substituting (47) and (48) into (46),
A straightforward extension of (49) yields the key capacity region of K 2 as
The Markov chains
and relationships (17) and (18) can be obtained using the similar methods in Section V.
The converse proof for Theorem 2 has been completed.
B. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY
This part provides the details of the achievable scheme for GK-capacity region. If there exists at least one scheme to achieve the rate R 2 with
the key capacity region of K 2 can be said to be an achievable region. Without loss of generality, similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, the achievable scheme for the General Case is discussed first. Assume that min{I (
Before going further, a many-to-one mapping is constructed in the following theorem, which will be used later.
Theorem 3: Given two non-empty sets X = {x 1 , . . . , x i } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y j }, one many-to-one mapping function is constructed as follow.
For each element x i ∈ X , there always exists one and only one unique element y j ∈ Y corresponding to it. y j is called the image of x i under mapping and is recorded as: y j = (x i ). x i is called the object of y j about mapping . Denote (X ) as the range of mapping , which contains the set of images of all elements in X . This mapping allows multiple x i to correspond to a unified image y j . The details of the achievable scheme for General Case are shown as follows.
1) CODEBOOK CONSTRUCTION
Three codebooks are constructed at Alice, denoted as C 3 , C 4 and C 5 . To construct C 3 , according to 
Denote g(T N 3 ) as the bin index of sequence T N 3 , and denote ρ(T N 3 ) as the sub-bin index of sequence T N 3 . To construct C 4 , according to n i=1 P T 2 (T 2,i ), randomly and independently generate 2 nR 11 sequences T n 2 , and further partition these sequences into 2 nR 12 equal-size bins B T 2 (η) indexed by bin index η with η ∈ [1 : 2 nR 12 ]. Then, for each T n 2 , according to
, randomly and conditionally independently generate 2 nR 13 sequences T n 1 . The binning rates are given by
Denote η(T n 2 ) as the bin index of sequence T n 2 . To construct C 5 , randomly and independently partition these sequences T n 1 into 2 nR 14 bins B T 2 (θ) indexed by bin index θ with θ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 14 ]. R 14 is given by
Denote θ(T n 1 ) as the bin index of sequence T n 1 . The codebook construction is illustrated in FIGURE 6, and the codebook assignment is revealed to all parties.
2) MANY-TO-ONE MAPPING
A many-to-one mapping from C 3 to C 4 is constructed as
where two sets {B T 3 (g, ρ)} and {B T 2 (η)} are defined as
Suppose that ({B T 3 (g, ρ)}) ⊂ {B T 2 (η)} and the value of | ({B T 3 (g, ρ)})| is as large as possible. 
. To construct C 5 , assign all T n 1 into 2 nR 14 bins (R 14 is the expected key rate). The two grey circles shown in this figure are the same sequence. A many-to-one mapping between C 3 and C 4 is constructed, and this figure provides an example: given a sequence T N 3 ∈ B T 3 (2, 2), the image of it in C 4 is B T 2 (1).
3) ENCODING
As illustrated in FIGURE 7, Alice refers to C 3 and finds one sequence T N 3 that is jointly typical with U N such that
If there is more than one such sequences, she selects one of them uniformly at random, and if no such sequence exist, an error event is declared. Alice reveals the bin index g(T N 3 ) over the one-way public communication channel.
After choosing T N 3 , Alice refers to C 4 and finds the corre-
. Then, Alice randomly chooses a sequence T n 2 from the bin B T 2 (η). Furthermore, Alice looks into the sequences T n 1 generated by the T n 2 and randomly selects one T n 1 and sends it to receivers through the DM-WBC.
4) DECODING

As illustrated in FIGURE 7, upon receiving g(T N
3 ) and observing V N , Bob tries to find a unique sequenceT N 3 that is jointly typical with V N such thatT N 3 ∈ B T 3 (g) and
If there is more than one such sequencesT N 3 , he chooses one of them at random. If such sequence does not exist, he claims decoding failure.
After decodingT N 3 , Bob finds the sub-bin index ρ(T N 3 ) and further finds the bin
Then, Bob refers to the bin B T 2 (η) and tries to find a unique sequenceT n 2 that is jointly typical with Y n
If there is more than one such sequences, he chooses one of them at random. If no such sequence, he claims decoding failure. Furthermore, Bob looks into the sequences T n 1 generated by theT n 2 , and finds a unique sequenceT n 1 that is jointly typical withT n 2 and Y n
. If there exists more than one such sequences, he randomly selects one. If no such sequence, he claims decoding failure. Bob then refers to C 5 and finds the bin index θ(T n 1 ). Similarly, Carol also tries to find unique sequencesT n 1 ,T n
If the corresponding sequences do not exist, he claims decoding failure. Carol then finds the bin index θ(T n 1 ) from C 5 .
5) KEY GENERATION
Alice sets
6) KEY RATE ANALYSIS
Notice that θ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 14 ], the key rate of K 2 can be as large as
7) ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
Similarly to the analysis of Theorem 1, define
or cannot find suchT
By the same analytical method for
Take E 4 and E 7 as examples. 3 that is jointly typical with V N and W N respectively, from each bin with high probability (due to that min{I (T 3 ; V ), I (T 3 ; W )} ≤ I (T 3 ; W ) and min{I (T 3 ; V ), I (T 3 ; W )} ≤ I (T 3 ; V ) ). The error events E 4 and E 7 happen with vanishing probability. The remaining events happen with vanishing probability due to the packing lemma.
8) KEY LEAKAGE RATE ANALYSIS (SECURITY)
Denote C as the whole of codebooks C 3 , C 4 and C 5 . This part analyzes the key leakage rate of K 2 over C, i.e., the secrecy condition (9) is satisfied. The public discussion F = {g}, and let g := g(T N 3 ), ρ := ρ(T N 3 ) and θ := θ(T n 1 ). Then,
where (a) = 0 is due to the θ and g are mutual independent; (b) = 0 follows the Markov chain θ − g − Z n . Remark 5: Revisiting the four special cases of GKcapacity region described in Section IV-B, the achievable scheme for each special case is discussed as follows.
• Special Case 1: x = 0, z = 0 and y > 0, { > 0.
The upper bound of R 2 becomes
which can be achieved utilizing C 3 with the same binning rates, and setting K 2 = ρ with ρ ∈ [1 : 2 N R 10 ].
• Special Case 2: y = 0, { = 0 and x > 0, z > 0.
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which can be achieved utilizing C 2 , and the binning rates are changed as
and K 2 is set as K 2 = γ with γ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 07 ].
• Special Case 3: x = 0, { = 0 and y > 0 and z > 0. The upper bound of R 2 becomes
which can be achieved using C 1 and C 2 , and the binning rates are changed as
and K 2 can be set asK 2 = µ andK 2 = γ .
• Special Case 4: y = 0, z = 0 and x > 0, { > 0. The upper bound of R 2 becomes
The achievable scheme of this special case is similar to that of Special Case 3. The setup of binning rates is omitted.
• Special Case 5: x = 0 or y = 0 or z = 0 or { = 0. Take x = 0 for example, the upper bound of R 2 becomes
which can be achieved using the achievable scheme of GK-generation for General Case, and R 14 is changed as
The achievability proof of Theorem 2 has been completed. 
VII. EXAMPLE: BINARY ERASURE CHANNELS
In this section, an example of the considered model shown in FIGURE 2 for GK-generation is presented (the idea of that for PK-generation is similar). The DM-WBC and the correlated sources are defined as (see FIGURE 8)
• The main channels (Bob's channel and Carol's channel) and the wiretap channel (Eve's channel) are all assumed to be binary erasure channels, i.e.,
Z = X with probability 1 − δ Z e with probability δ Z .
• The correlated sources are assumed to be binary sources. An auxiliary RV T 3 is constructed, and consider the correlated sources (T 3 , U , V , W ) ∈ {0, 1} with joint pmf
for ∈ (0, 1). According to (16) Then, H (T 3 , U ), H (T 3 , V ) and H (T 3 , W ) are shown in (70), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
Furthermore, according to (17) ,
and similarly,
To recap, the GK-capacity region becomes
where (71) can be achieved by setting T 2 = ∅. The constraint conditions (72) and (73) are equivalent to
Based on (71)−(73), the effects of and δ Z on GK-capacity region are shown in FIGURE 9 and FIGURE 10, respectively. The parameter λ is assumed to be unity. • If δ Y 1 = δ Y 2 = 0 happens, which means the main channels (Bob's channel and Carol's channel) are noiseless, the GK-capacity region becomes
The GK-capacity region increases linearly with the increase of δ Z .
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has considered the problem of PK and GK generation using correlated sources and the DM-WBC when a oneway communication over the public channel is available. The key capacity regions of PK and GK were fully characterized, and the achievable schemes that can achieve these regions were further provided. The use of GK can avoid the harm caused by the receiving terminals not knowing the key when a common message needed to be transmitted to all legitimate terminals.
In future works, the following problems will be considered: 1) Since the PK and GK capacity regions shown in this paper were provided based on straightforward extensions, more general results and the case with degraded version of the considered model will be studied; 2) Recently, the problem of wiretap channel coding for key generation on source models was studied in [50] and [51] using polar coding. Furthermore, the problem of key generation for wiretap channel using polar coding or other wiretap channel coding schemes can be considered. 3) As an extension of [40] , the problem of key generation over multi-receiver wiretap channel with noiseless or noisy feedback will also be investigated.
It is clear that
N(y
